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Becoming With, in Life and Death 
HANNAH KUEMMERLE 
Based on a life-long relationship between trust and domination of human and horse, this essay is a personal reflection 
on how perceptions and relationships shape the way we (as humans and other-than-humans in shared relationships) 
deal with implemented mercy deaths. What can we learn from each other when it comes to the decision of putting our 
companions down? This contribution explores, on one hand, the relation between domination and compassion as a way 
of dealing with an animal’s life and death. On the other hand it investigates trust and correspondence beyond borders 
of human exceptionalism as a different, more open way of becoming with each other, focussing on the transformative 
potential of co-responding relationships. 
It was a rainy day in autumn 2014, when my father called, telling me that my sister Laika was diagnosed 
with a tumour in her left jaw. Living in Scotland, I booked the next available flight to Germany, feeling sick 
of life and afraid of death. Arriving at home, there was not much to do. The tumour grew within days and the 
only thing left was to say goodbye. When the specialists arrived with the syringe to put her down, it felt as if 
a part of me died with her. 
A lifelong bond entangled Laika with her family, but especially her sister Larissa. They met when 
they were young and always stayed together. They slept next to each other, shared their food, supported each 
other and where afraid without each other. It seemed always clear: as they lived, they would die. Both would 
leave this world together one day. The day the decision was made to put Laika to sleep, Larissa proved me 
wrong, raising questions that inform this essay. 
Most people would consider Laika and Larissa as quite ordinary horses. Their bodily features re-
veal them as animals, with a tail, a mane, four hooves on the ground and three different gaits. They carry us 
around, eat hay and grass and don’t speak. For me, they were different. They were my siblings, trusted friends 
who influenced my becoming in this world. When I had to put Laika down, it struck me how we humans, who 
often consider ourselves as friends or companions, family members, or even teachers or pupils of non-human 
animals (Sanders 1995, Despret 2004, Birke 2007, Maurstad et al 2013), also consider ourselves as able to 
decide about life and death of these fellow beings. Informed by the life and death of Laika and Larissa, and 
supported by literature from the field of social anthropology and human animal studies, this essay is a person-
al reflection on how perceptions and relationships shape the way we (as humans and non-humans in shared 
relationships) deal with implemented mercy deaths. I will investigate this topic in respect to what Despret, 
in her study about everyday practices of cattle and pig breeders, calls the “difference which matters” (2008: 
133). In the first part, I will examine human approaches which render “modes of subjectivity” (ibid) impos-
sible, exploring domination and compassion as ways of dealing with an animal’s life and death. Does an 
act of mercy killing, based on a compassionate decision, arise from a bond based on mutual understanding? 
What does this indicate about relationships between us humans and our non-human companions? Guided 
by Larissa, the second part will consider relationships “where humans and animals talk to each other, make 
each other propositions, get on and present modes of subjectivity to each other” (ibid), concentrating on the 
transformative potential of co-responding relationships between humans and non-humans, inquiring trust and 
mutual understanding as an alternative way of becoming together. 
Domination and Compassion 
The term euthanasia originates from Greek, meaning ‘good death’ (eu – ‘good/well’ + thanatos – ‘death’, 
Online Etymology Dictionary 2001 - 2014). According to Mosterín (2006) and others (Pool and Geissler 
2005, Richards 2012), setting a date for a ‘good death’ derives from a desire to control the departure from this 
word as painless and calmly as possible. Although humans are seen as having, in contrast to other species, 
the ability not only to reflect upon their lives and decisions but also actively decide for their lives to end, it 
paradoxically seems to be less controversial to control an animal’s death than to plan one’s own passing away 
(McMahan 2002, Sanders 1995, Warren 1997). 
 As mentioned above, Laika and Larissa were inseparable. If I would go on a walk or ride with only 
one of them I never got far. Laika or Larissa would only walk a few meters and then just stop. There is no 
way you can move a 400 kg horse unless it wants to move (or you belong to the riders who use whips). Thus, 
from being two years old, both were together day and night, creating in our minds the idea that if one horse 
would die the other would somehow follow soon. Consequently, when Laika was diagnosed with her tumour, 
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Figure 2: Laika and Larissa, inseparably
Figure 3: Becoming with. Larissa and I
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no one questioned putting Larissa down, especially as she had arthritis (a joint disease) for years. What if her 
illness would get worse? What if the grief about the death of her sister would break her and we would have to 
put her down shortly thereafter? Regarding the fact that horses are herd animals and should never live alone, 
would it not be an act of compassion to save her from living a life full of pain, even worse without her sister? 
Our compassionate conclusion was driven by the fear of the consequences and the unexpected, but it was 
agreed: as in life so in death! Both horses would be put down together. Although our decision was not an easy 
one, it was certainly something my family could live with. For most of us it felt sad, but all right. That is the 
way life goes, is it not? At some point you just have to put most animals down and after all, the reasoning 
goes, it is luckily not your ‘real’ sister. In trying to understand this relative lack of discomfort surrounding 
the death of animals in contemporary western society (Sanders 1995), and to comprehend, in this context, my 
family’s straight-forward decision, I consulted the Bible, as a well-pronounced account of our society’s still 
pervasive Judeo-Christian roots. In the Genesis, God creates mankind in his likeness “so that they may rule 
over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals, and over all the 
creatures that move along the ground.’’ (Holy Bible, Genesis 1:26). As Martin (1992), in his comprehensive 
discussion of Genesis 1:26 analyses, humans seem to be defined superior, created in God’s image. We alone 
are seen to possess a soul, made to rule over all other creatures, belonging to the realm of culture. Animals, 
Martin further reflects, seem to be mainly created for humans’ use and enjoyment. They have not been built 
in God’s likeness, lack soul, and belong to the realm of nature (Ingold 2000). Due to their “limited cognitive 
and emotional capacities” animals seem to be “not responsible agents”, incapable of deep relations and un-
able to engage in “complex and skilled activities” (McMahan 2002: 8). These themes were all reflected in my 
family’s lived experience when deciding for Larissa to die: We took the decision in our hands as a matter of 
course. Larissa, on her part, did not seem to comprehend the complex intellectual decision-making process 
we were engaged in for days. And how could she? She was, after all, just an animal. This deep dichotomy 
between humans as superior, controlling, and responsible and the inferior, controlled animal relegated Larissa 
to the category of property: she was, after all, in our possession and as ‘caring’ humans it was our right and 
responsibility to make a final decision. Just as Ducos (in Ingold 2000: 64) states, “Human beings, as social 
persons, can own; animals, as natural objects, are only ownable”. The decision we took, and how we took 
it, revealed the unquestioned ambivalence that characterised our relationships with Larissa and Laika. I was 
only ten years old when I first saw them, and felt immediately a strong love and affection for ‘my’ horses. The 
thought of them dying one day worried me my whole life. But why, then, did I still use the whip if I wanted 
them to ‘learn’ something they would not do right in a particular moment? Why did I still force them to work 
even if they wanted to stay in their field? And why did I still try to persuade them to jump over obstacles if 
they did not want to? Surprisingly, they still called me when I walked by their field. They rubbed their heads 
gently on my arm or shoulder when I stopped by and welcomed me after a period away from them. This 
highly ambiguous relationship, what in previous literature has been theorised as that of trust and domination 
(Ingold 2000), was reflected in the decision about Larissa’s death: Deciding for her to die made us treat her 
as a non-person, almost as an object, as a being without a separate will or intentionality for us to take into 
account. Feeling the responsibility for our protégé, we decided for her death in order to save her from pain, 
perceiving the decision as compassionate act of ‘mercy killing’. 
How does deciding for a non-human animal on the basis of compassion compare and relate to the 
notion of domination seen above? In order to more fully understand the contemporary use of the word com-
passion, I consulted the Oxford Dictionary (2014). Compassion is here translated as “sympathetic pity and 
concern for [emphasis added] the sufferings or misfortunes of others” and one example cites that “the victims 
should be treated with compassion”. This definition, in combination with the example, seems to function well 
in a hierarchical order between a merciful master and his subordinate. Our decision about Larissa’s death 
was a compassionate, sympathetic one. Taken by us, her ‘masters’, for her, the animal. Deciding for someone 
else, then, no matter whether with compassion or cruelty, implies a control over the other, who is not able 
or allowed to decide or participate in a decision. The concept of compassion for someone, thus, seems to 
correspond with the treatment of animals as non-persons, or objects, in a relationship of dependency. If we 
take a closer look at the etymological roots of sympathy and compassion however, a different picture opens 
up: both expressions speak about an affinity, a shared feeling between certain parties. Originating from the 
Latin word compati, compassion means to suffer with (Online Etymology Dictionary 2001 - 2014) – sharing 
the suffering of someone else, building a bridge between different levels. Sympathy, likewise, stems from 
feeling together (syn – ‘together’ + pathos – ‘feeling’, Online Etymology Dictionary 2001 - 2015). Thus, if a 
master shares something with his subordinate, a relationship is more likely to meet at eye level and mutuality 
is possible. Compassionately sharing life and death with the non-humans we live with seems, then, rooted in 
a different way of being together which I will further examine below. 
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Trust and Correspondence 
While discussing the issue of Larissa’s life and death with my family, sitting inside the house with a coffee, I 
thought about all these questions. I could understand the arguments put forward and agreed to put both horses 
down together. However, when spending time with Laika and Larissa, or even when I was alone at night, 
something kept me alert or awake. I therefore decided to spend more time with the horses, to understand 
where my conflicting feelings originate. Slowly, over the following days, our relationship deepened. And it 
did not only change Larissa, or me, but my entire family and our decision. 
But let’s go back and try to understand what happened: When I decided to involve myself not only in 
a decision making process around the coffee table, but to spend more and more time with the horses, I sud-
denly experienced what Tim Ingold (2000: 69) calls a “[…] deep, personal and affectionate involvement… 
[an] involvement not just of mind or body but of one’s entire, undivided being”. Boundaries, which made 
Larissa, in our eyes, ‘animal’ and us ‘human’, started to blur step-by-step as I got to know her better. Yes, 
she was limping, but I noticed that her eyes were clear and full of life, her posture was energetic, and her 
movements showed her highest spirit in years. Every part of her body told me how she relished the warm sun 
on her coat, how flexibly the soil supported her painful hooves and how much she enjoyed the grass she wal-
lowed in. Her strong movements, her liveliness, her good appetite, and her contentment told me, undoubtedly, 
that she wanted to live. The undivided presence and ‘availability’ of both, Larissa and me, created openness 
within the other, produced a body and mind open to become with the other, allowing a particular, personal 
communication of body-, sign-, and spoken language to unfold between us. Just as Despret (2004) in her 
work about ‘Anthropo-zoo-genesis’ found out: if human and horse start to attentively focus on each other, 
to get involved with each other, their bodies become more sensitive, start to speak to each other and embody 
each other’s minds. When I felt how far I could enter Larissa’s world through openness and attentiveness, 
through letting her be my teacher, I understood that she could teach me as much about death as she did about 
life. I was not only myself, alone with a frightening decision anymore, I was a ‘becoming Larissa-Hannah’, 
not only thinking about her life, but suddenly experiencing life with her. And as I understood in that moment, 
she, too, was not Larissa anymore, but ‘becoming Hannah-Larissa’. We both shared our lives, opened up for 
each other and started to trust in our relationship. We were not merely agents of different species anymore, 
but beings becoming with the other. And as Donna Haraway states so strikingly, only if we enter into rela-
tionships based on mutuality and correspondence between persons who transform each other, are we able to 
“become when species meet” (2008: 5, emphasis added). Our involvement, our being-with-each-other, told 
us to trust each other. I ‘made’ a Larissa which wanted to be with me and vice versa. This process of ‘making-
each-other-up’ through close and attentive interactions changed our entire (body-) language. Along with her 
showing me how much she enjoyed being alive, my body language became more self-confident. I was more 
and more able to express the changing relationship between Larissa and me and to tell my family what I ex-
perienced. Instead of seeking to convince my fellow humans, based upon my own engagement with Larissa, 
I asked them to get involved on their own. Not being familiar with this degree of trust and openness towards 
a non-human animal, my family was initially sceptical. But as they sensed how much this deep involvement 
had changed my appearance, body language and conviction, my father soon began to take time with Larissa 
too, and eventually got his answers concerning her life or death from herself. Not having to carry the weight 
of this decision alone anymore, I saw that everyone’s closeness with Larissa now put her in the centre of 
focus and discussion. No one was discussing for or against her life anymore. Everyone became aware of her 
particular way of being in the world, and her personal way of joining the discussion related to her future. “Re-
lationships based on trust”, as Ingold (2000: 70) states, build the contrast to “those based on domination”. 
Trusting Larissa as responsible agent allowed us to recognize her personal autonomy, understanding the re-
dundancy of control (Ingold 2000). The deep, affectionate, growing relationship with her took the weight off 
everyone’s shoulders, as she joined the discussion and taught us in these days that a decision for or against 
euthanasia is not a decision to be carried by the ‘animals owner’ alone, but that it could, and perhaps should, 
evolve from an open and attentive communicative engagement with each other. 
Trusting our joint becoming with, we finally decided not to put Larissa down but to let life unfold. 
The first weeks after her sister’s death where tough but soon after we found a new companion for her. She is 
now walking more than she did during the last couple of years. She is full of life and energy and shows us 
every day that our joint decision was the right one. 
Our experiences seemed to resonate, in many ways, with Ingold’s notion of the meshwork and the 
entanglement of humans, animals and environment, where “[…] the organism (animal or human) should be 
understood not as a bounded entity surrounded by an environment but as an unbounded entanglement of lines 
in fluid space” (2011: 64). Spending time and attentive engagement with Larissa enabled us to understand 
life in a different way. It emphasised what we shared as living beings, as opposed to what separated us. Our 
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shared process showed us that beings, as entangled lines of interaction, and their relationships in life and 
death, evoke living knots of mutual understanding. It reflected how shared, open decisions about life and 
death beyond the limits of human exceptionalism, that posit strict boundaries between ‘humans’ or ‘animals’, 
can potentially allow fearless, creative decisions to reveal themselves. 
Concluding Reflections 
Initially, neither my family nor I were able to perceive Larissa as anything other than an animal, hence it 
was our task to care, to decide what was best for her. As her human ‘masters’ and owners we felt the heavy 
weight of responsibility on our shoulders when it came to her death. Driven by fear of an uncertain future, 
we decided to take it in our hands and compassionately decide for the animal to die. As explored above, the 
predicament that we found ourselves in, and our reactions to it, echoes a wider discourse of human-animal 
relationships related to human mastery and control. Counteracting this notion, and our initial decision, the 
final result, I argue, was a shared decisions based upon growing relationships of trust. The new level of trust 
connecting Larissa with myself and the rest of my family based itself not upon a hierarchy of difference, but 
instead emphasised what was shared through an experientially grounded compassionate engagement with 
each other. 
Through closely interacting with Larissa at this crucial moment in both of our lives, and the ensu-
ing process of open, reflective thought and decision-making, I came to realise the potential of the animal’s 
ability to be part of defining its own time for departure (through euthanasia or ‘on time’). Putting beings in 
the centre, both humans and non-humans, and learning from their sensations towards life opens the way for 
becoming with, experiencing that we are “constitutively, companion species. We make each other up, in the 
flesh” (Haraway, 2008: 16). 
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